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Abstract
This survey of 206 forensic psychologists tested the “filtering” effects of preexisting expert
attitudes in adversarial proceedings. Results confirmed the hypothesis that evaluator atti-
tudes toward capital punishment influence willingness to accept capital case referrals from
particular adversarial parties. Stronger death penalty opposition was associated with higher
willingness to conduct evaluations for the defense and higher likelihood of rejecting referrals
from all sources. Conversely, stronger support was associated with higher willingness to be
involved in capital cases generally, regardless of referral source. The findings raise the
specter of skewed evaluator involvement in capital evaluations, where evaluators willing to
do capital casework may have stronger capital punishment support than evaluators who opt
out, and evaluators with strong opposition may work selectively for the defense. The results
may provide a partial explanation for the “allegiance effect” in adversarial legal settings
such that preexisting attitudes may contribute to partisan participation through a self-selec-
tion process.
Introduction
Adversarial legal systems, such as the American system, are designed so that two advocates rep-
resent their parties’ respective positions before an impartial trier-of-fact (typically a judge or
jury), whose task is to ferret out truth and make a binding decision to provide justice [1]. Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence [2] allows expert witnesses to testify in a case if they have
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that would help the trier-of-fact better
understand a particular piece of evidence or reach a determination about a contested fact, so
long as the expert’s methods and application to the particular case were appropriate. The law,
and the various professions in which these experts are trained, generally presume that these
experts will be impartial, participating as an objective expert by interpreting data on its own
strength, rather than in a biased manner reflecting which side hired them.
However, a growing body of research demonstrates the biasing effects of the adversarial
legal system on experts. Most of these studies are field studies that show evidence of forensic
expert partiality in patterns of data from actual cases, but they cannot explain the reason for
that partiality because they are not true experiments (e.g., [3–7]). The experts’ partiality might
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be explained in many ways. For instance, the socialization of the expert witness to the case
could be affected by the retaining party (i.e., the adversarial process corrupts a neutral expert).
Or perhaps the bias may exist in the attitudes of forensic experts before referrals are even
accepted; that is, the expert may be partial and self-select or filter adversarial involvement
before the adversarial process starts. Or attorneys might choose to retain evaluators who have
preexisting attitudes that favor their side, or call only those experts with favorable findings to
testify in court [8].
One research team recently conducted an experimental study to isolate the causal link
between adversarial side and a forensic experts’ biased interpretation of data. Murrie, Boccac-
cini, Guarnera, and Rufino [9] had forensic mental health professionals conduct a “file review”
of a case, leading the experts to believe this was an actual case rather than a research study. The
sole experimental manipulation was referral source (defense or prosecuting attorney), and all
the other information was held constant. The forensic experts were asked to review informa-
tion about the offender and score two common and well-researched risk assessment tools. The
results provided strong evidence of “adversarial allegiance,” or the tendency for experts to
reach conclusions that support the retaining party’s position. Specifically, experts who thought
they were working for the prosecution assigned higher risk scores to offenders and experts who
thought they were working for the defense assigned lower risk scores to those same offenders,
with effect sizes (d) ranging up to 0.85. These results indicate that the first explanation in the
preceding paragraph was correct–that presumably neutral experts were “corrupted” simply by
knowing from whom the referral came.
But is that the only possible explanation for forensic expert partiality? Perhaps there are
multiple, non-mutually-exclusive factors underlying apparent expert partiality. Basic research
in psychological science tells us that elements of the situation interact with elements about a
given person to predict behavior [10], and people choose to enter and spend time in situations
that reflect features of their personalities and promote the expression of their social attitudes
[11–12]. The Murrie et al. study [9] provides compelling information about the power of the
situation–the adversarial context itself–on expert interpretation of data. But what about the
unique characteristics of the experts themselves? In addition to the demonstrated influence of
the adversarial system on forensic expert partiality, might attorney and expert selection effects
also occur due to the unique characteristics of the experts, with the potential to amplify expert
partiality in the adversarial system? For instance, biased experts retained by an adversarial
party may then be influenced by the retaining attorney’s theory of the case, further skewing
their perspective.
The present study addresses one of these questions. Specifically, it examines evaluator self-
selection as a complementary explanation for expert partiality in adversarial legal settings via a
“filtering” process. To answer this question, we measured the death penalty attitudes of 206
forensic psychologists and asked them whether they would be willing to accept referrals in cap-
ital cases from the defense, prosecution, and court. If death penalty attitudes are shown to be
systematically related to willingness to accept capital cases from particular referrals sources, it
will demonstrate that preexisting expert bias may contribute to expert partiality in the adver-
sarial legal system through a self-selection “filtering” process of involvement in cases.
Importantly, any evidence of “filtering” of forensic mental health experts in capital cases is
but one particular context in which this type of “filtering” phenomenon may occur. We use
this one context as an initial example, but assert that if evidence of filtering or self-selecting
effects are found in this context that these filtering effects can likely be found in other contexts
as well, with other kinds of forensic experts. This self-selection effect is not presumed to be spe-
cific to mental health experts or to capital cases. For instance, product experts in medical mal-
practices cases might make decisions about whether to take a case from the plaintiff or defense
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based on their preexisting beliefs about tort law generally. Experts in these cases might selec-
tively work for insurance firms on defense if they believe tort law has grown out of control and
support the tort reform movement, and other experts might selectively choose to work for the
plaintiff if they believe tort litigation continues to play an important role in our society.
Forensic Mental Health Evaluations in Capital Cases
Capital punishment is one of the most fiercely debated issues in American society. It is a pow-
erful legal, ethical, and moral issue about which many people have strongly held opinions. In
capital cases, mental health practitioners may be asked to evaluate a defendant’s mental health
to help the court adjudicate the case. Thus, it is possible that in capital case evaluations, exam-
iners’ attitudes toward capital punishment might influence their willingness to become
involved or the specific ways in which they would become involved in the adversarial process.
A variety of different forensic evaluations can be considered “capital case” referrals, from
insanity pleas, to capital mitigation, capital sentencing risk assessments, competence for execu-
tion evaluations, and evaluations of intellectual disability. For example, for a possible insanity
plea, a clinician could be asked to assess whether the defendant exhibited symptoms of mental
illness at the time of the alleged crime to help the court determine whether the defendant
should be found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.
In capital mitigation cases, the assessor could report on factors that could reduce the severity
of punishment from death down to life in prison, such as a defendant’s history of abuse or lack
of prior violence or criminal record. In capital sentencing risk assessments, clinicians are often
asked to help the court decide whether the evaluee poses a future danger to society. For inmates
sentenced to death, clinicians might be asked long after the sentencing date whether the inmate
is competent to move forward with a pending execution. And for Atkins-type evaluations, cli-
nicians are asked to help the court determine whether a capital defendant is intellectually dis-
abled (formerly called mental retardation), because the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 2002
that executing an intellectually disabled individual would violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment [13].
Evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment and involvement in capital cases. The
strength of an evaluator’s opinions toward the death penalty may influence whether and how
clinicians become involved in capital case work. For instance, evaluators who strongly oppose
the death penalty report being significantly less likely to accept a Competency for Execution
(CFE) referral [14–15]. These findings suggest there are self-selection factors in some capital
case evaluations, in which the evaluators who take CFE referrals may be more supportive of the
death penalty than evaluators who decline.
Haney [16] argued that “death qualification” of juries facilitates death sentencing because
only people who support capital punishment are allowed to have a say in deciding whether any
capital defendant lives or dies. This is because the United States Supreme Court decided that in
order to serve in a capital case, jurors must be willing to consider all sentencing options; that is,
if their opinions would prevent them from considering death, they are not “death qualified”
and must be stricken from the jury [17–18]. Haney points out, “capital juries can only represent
the conscience of one part of the community–the part that collectively tilts toward death”
(p. 139). If a similar process occurs in experts, and self-selection leads to death-qualified psy-
chologists being the only (or primary) professionals who are evaluators in some kinds of capital
cases, the pool of potential examiners may misrepresent the range of examiner attitudes toward
capital punishment. In addition to concern about the strength of an examiner’s personal sup-
port for the death penalty, Cunningham and Reidy [19] argue that the stronger one’s opposi-
tion, the more concerns about objectivity are increased. They suggest that mental health
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professionals who are strong advocates against capital punishment may find themselves in an
ethically compromised dual-role if they are hired as experts in capital cases.
The Current Project
The research to date has surveyed forensic clinicians about whether they would accept a refer-
ral in a particular kind of case, without assessing from whom the clinician would consider
accepting the referral (such as CFE evaluations [14–15]). However, the referral party theoreti-
cally matters in capital cases. The “direction” of capital punishment attitude bias can be pre-
dicted to fall along adversarial party lines, such that clinicians who more strongly support the
death penalty may be more likely to accept capital case referrals from the prosecution whereas
clinicians who strongly oppose the death penalty may be more likely to accept defense referrals.
This hypothesis–that evaluators who more strongly support the death penalty will be more
likely to accept capital case referrals from the prosecution, whereas those who oppose the death
penalty will be more likely to accept capital case referrals from the defense–is the central
hypothesis of the current study.
Of note, this hypothesis is invariant to the “type” of capital case referral. That is, evaluators
who strongly support capital punishment are hypothesized to be more likely to accept a capital
case referral from the prosecution in insanity evaluations, in risk assessments, in CFE evalua-
tions, and in Atkins-type evaluations. The reverse is hypothesized for evaluators who hold
strong anti-capital punishment attitudes. They would theoretically be more likely to accept a
capital case referral from the defense in insanity evaluations, mitigation evaluations, risk assess-
ments, CFE evaluations, and Atkins-type evaluations.
This study also tests the supplemental a priori hypothesis that examiners willing to accept
capital case referrals (i.e., get involved in capital cases generally) will have stronger death pen-
alty support than those who abstain. This hypothesis parallels for expert witnesses Haney’s
[16] “death qualification” hypothesis about jurors in capital cases. Our aims for this study were
achieved; we were able to test both the central and supplemental hypotheses, as detailed below.
Method
Participants
The participants in this study consisted of practicing forensic psychologists in the U.S.A. The
American Psychological Association (APA) website directory was utilized in an attempt to gen-
erate 1000 randomly selected participants who were clinical-forensic psychologists. It was
unclear how many clinical-forensic psychologists were available in the population from which
to select, and only 962 psychologists with clinical-forensic interests could be identified through
the APA directory. Thus, surveys were mailed to this population of 962 psychologists. Previous
research with both APA members and those who are not APA members indicate APA mem-
bership is sufficiently representative of doctoral-level clinicians with respect to demographic
characteristics, education, and employment to use the member database for research purposes
[20].
Of the 962 surveys mailed, 351 were completed. Other large national surveys of clinical-
forensic psychologists in the U.S.A. have yielded similar sample sizes (e.g., N = 434 in Neal &
Grisso [21]). Of the 351 completed surveys, 249 of the respondents reported practicing in a
jurisdiction with the death penalty. Of these 249 participants, only 206 provided complete
answers to the “willingness to accept referral” questions. Thus, for the purposes of this paper,
analyses are restricted to the 206 participants who practice in death penalty jurisdictions and
who answered the critical dependent variables. Respondents included forensic psychologists
from all 31 states with the death penalty, plus 4 additional states that still had the death penalty
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as of the time these data were collected in late 2010 (CT, IL, MD, and NE) [22], as well as psy-
chologists practicing in the federal system.
Most participants were White (91.6%; 4.8% Hispanic, 0.8% Asian-American, 0.4% African-
American, 2.4% Other). The average age was 58.84 (SD = 9.42) and approximately three-quar-
ters were men (72%). The majority had a Ph.D. (86%; 13% Psy.D.; 1% Other). Participants
reported an average of 22.24 years of conducting forensic evaluations (SD = 9.39). Approxi-
mately 28% reported being board-certified. Most participants reported working in private prac-
tice or for private agencies (60%), followed by public sector institutions or agencies (17%), and
university settings (10%; 13% “other or more than one”).
Procedure
Approval was sought from and provided by the University of Alabama Institutional Review
Board for the Protection of Human Subjects prior to beginning this work. The survey packets
were mailed because surveys conducted via postal mail produce higher response rates than
electronic mail [23]. The mailed packet included a cover letter indicating the research was
being conducted by a university graduate student, an Institutional Review Board informed con-
sent sheet, the set of questionnaires printed on green paper, and a separate debriefing page.
Also enclosed were a self-addressed stamped envelope with first-class outgoing postage and a
one-dollar bill as gesture of appreciation for participation. A follow-up postcard was sent two
weeks after the initial mailings to express appreciation to those who had responded and to
remind those who had not responded about the survey. Prior studies have demonstrated that
each of these methods have independent effects on increasing response rates in postal surveys
[24–25].
Measures
Forensic psychologist questionnaire. Developed for use in this study, this questionnaire
included questions about highest degree earned, specialty board certification, primary place of
employment, number of years conducting forensic evaluations, jurisdictions of practice, and
death penalty status in those jurisdictions. For those evaluators practicing in jurisdictions with
the death penalty, they were asked, “Have you or would you evaluate a defendant in a capital
case for the prosecution?” as well as “. . .for the defense?” and “. . .for the court as a court-
appointed assessor?” The questionnaire also included demographic race, age, and gender
items.
Death Penalty Attitudes Scale (DPAS). O’Neil, Patry, and Penrod [26] developed the
15-item DPAS to measure attitudes toward the death penalty. Items are answered on a nine-
point Likert-type scale (1, strongly disagree, to 9, strongly agree) with higher scores indicating
greater death penalty support. Although the scale was initially designed to measure jurors’
death penalty attitudes, the scale has been found to correlate highly (r> 0.85) with other mea-
sures of death penalty support and has demonstrated strong psychometric properties in previ-
ous research. Results were used to obtain quantitative data regarding the relative strength of
the forensic psychologists’ attitudes toward the death penalty. The DPAS evidenced good reli-
ability in this sample; α = 0.84, average inter-item correlation = 0.27. As far as we are aware,
this is the first study to use the DPAS to measure forensic psychologists’ death penalty attitudes
(and may be the first study to ever measure forensic psychologists’ death penalty attitudes).
The average DPAS score among forensic psychologists for all valid responses in our overall
sample (n = 329) was 3.16 (SD = 1.25, range 1–7). The average DPAS score among the 206
cases analyzed in this paper was 3.08 (SD = 1.22, range = 1–6.33). These values are lower than
the values reported by O’Neil et al. [26] in the original validation article of the DPAS across 11
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studies. With a total combined sample size of 2,849 people across those 11 studies, O’Neil et al.
provided data about DPAS scores with a mean value of 4.83 –a higher value than in the forensic
psychologists who responded to our survey. However, there are two subsamples of the O’Neil
et al. data that are more relevant–and closer in mean value–to our participants. The mean
DPAS score for a subsample of the highly educated people their overall large sample (“post-col-
lege education”) was 4.14. And in a subsample of 127 older adults (“age 50+”) from O’Neil
et al.’s overall large sample, the mean DPAS value was 4.32.
Results
Multinomial logistic regression was used to analyze the central hypothesis because the predic-
tor variable was continuous (death penalty attitude score) and the dependent variable was a
nominal variable with five mutually-exclusive outcome groups. Each participant was only in
one outcome group, depending on from which source(s) they reported they would accept
capital referrals. The five outcome groups included forensic psychologists who would accept
referrals in capital cases from the defense or defense and court only (i.e., reject only the prose-
cution); from the prosecution or prosecution and court only (i.e., reject only the defense); from
only the court (i.e., reject only the adversarial referrals); accept from all of the three sources; or
accept from no sources at all.
Although we wanted to analyze the data by “defense only,” “prosecution only,” “court only,”
“all,” and “none,” there were not enough participants who fell into the “defense only” (n = 3)
and “prosecution only” (n = 0) groups to move forward with the analysis. Thus, we combined
participants who would accept only from the defense with those who would accept from the
defense and the court (but would reject the prosecution), calling this the “accept from defense
or defense-and-court only” group, which added 15 more participants for a total of 18 in this
group. We did the same for prosecution only + prosecution-and-court-only, but there were no
participants in either subgroup. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
Results are provided in Table 2 and Fig 1, indicating that the central hypothesis was partially
supported. The first part of the hypothesis–that forensic evaluators with stronger death penalty
support would be more likely to accept capital case referrals solely from the prosecution–was
not supported. This null result occurred because not a single forensic psychologist reported
that they would only work for the prosecution (or even for just the prosecution and court). In
contrast, 9% of the sample reported they would work only for the defense (or defense-and-
court only), 2% would work only for the court, 20% would refuse all capital referrals regardless
of source, and 68% would accept the referrals from any of the three sources.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Outcome Group a N DPAS
M SD Range
Accept Defense or Defense-and-Court Only 18 2.04 0.99 1.00–5.27
Accept Prosecution or Prosecution-and-Court Only 0 — — —
Accept Court Only 6 3.24 0.75 1.80–3.93
Accept From All Three Sources 140 3.33 1.17 1.00–6.33
Accept None (Refuse All Three Sources) 42 2.69 1.23 1.00–5.73
a Outcome group is a mutually exclusive category–each participant is only in one group, depending on from
which source(s) they reported they would accept capital referrals. DPAS = score on the Death Penalty
Attitudes Scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for the death penalty (range 1–9).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154434.t001
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The second part of the central hypothesis was supported. As predicted, lower death penalty
support was associated with a higher probability of accepting defense/defense-and-court-only
referrals compared to accepting referrals from the court only (odds ratio = 3.25; 95% CI 1.31–
8.10), from any of the three sources (3.45; 95% CI 1.82–6.52), and from none of the three
sources (2.11; 95% CI 1.09–4.11). These results mean that each one-unit increase in death pen-
alty support as measured by the DPAS more than tripled the odds of an examiner accepting
capital referrals solely from the court, more than tripled the odds of accepting from any source,
and more than doubled the odds of refusing all capital referrals, compared to accepting from
defense or defense-and-court only (i.e., rejecting only the prosecution).
Fig 1 graphically depicts these results. The red accept “all” referrals line at the top of the
graph shows that increasing death penalty support (on the X axis) is associated with a higher
predicted probability of belonging to the group of evaluators who would agree to accept capital
referrals from any source. The purple “none” line in the middle of the graph shows that lower
death penalty support is associated with a higher predicted probability of belonging to the
group of evaluators who would not accept any capital referrals. The blue “defense” line is simi-
lar to the purple “none” line in that lower death penalty support is associated with a higher pre-
dicted probability of belonging to the group of evaluators who would accept referrals only from
the defense or defense-and-court. Finally, the flat green “court” line at the bottom of the graph
shows that death penalty attitudes are not associated with likelihood of belonging to a group of
evaluators who would only work for the court in capital cases. Although the “court” line is flat,
the multinomial logistic regression result is significant because it compares the slope of that
line to the slope of the “defense” line, finding a difference in the two slopes relative to one
another (see Table 2 and paragraph above). It should be noted that more confidence can be
placed in the slope of the red “all” and purple “none” lines than the green “court” and blue
“defense” lines, given the subsample sizes in this dataset.
The supplemental “death qualification” hypothesis was supported. Examiners willing to
accept capital case referrals from any source (i.e., get involved in capital cases generally) had
significantly higher DPAS scores than examiners who would refuse to be involved in a capital
case in any capacity, t (204) = 2.40, p = 0.017, Cohen’s d = 0.34 (M = 3.19, SD = 1.20, n = 164
andM = 2.69, SD = 1.23, n = 42, respectively). This effect is amplified by comparing the
Table 2. Death Penalty Support Multinomial Logistic Regression Results.
Outcome Group N Β SE p OR 95% CI
Accept Defense or Defense-and-Court Only 18 (reference category)
Accept Prosecution or Prosecution-and-Court Only 0 — — — — —
Accept Court Only 6
Intercept -4.12 1.38 .003 — —
DPAS 1.18 .47 .011 3.25 1.31–8.10
Accept All 140
Intercept -1.16 .75 .122 — —
DPAS 1.24 .33 < .001 3.45 1.82–6.52
Accept None (Refuse All) 42
Intercept -.90 .80 >.250 — —
DPAS .75 .34 .028 2.11 1.09–4.11
The reference category is Willingness to Accept from Defense or Defense-and-Court Only (i.e., Reject only the Prosecution). OR is the odds ratio.
DPAS = score on the Death Penalty Attitudes Scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for the death penalty (range 1–9). The predictor variable
is score on the Death Penalty Attitudes Scale. The dependent variable is one of five mutually exclusive outcome groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154434.t002
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Fig 1. Multinomial Logistic Regression Graph of Death Penalty Support and Predicted Probability of Referral Acceptance fromMutually-Exclusive
Groups. The reference category is Willingness to Accept from Defense or Defense-and-Court Only (i.e., Reject only the Prosecution), which is labeled
“Defense” here. “All” = willing to accept from all three referral sources, “Court” = willing to accept only from the court, and “None” = not willing to accept from
any of the three referral sources. No participants reported they would accept from the prosecution only, and thus they are not represented on this graph.
DPAS = score on the Death Penalty Attitudes Scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for the death penalty (range 1–9). The sample sizes for the
red “all” and purple “none” lines are higher and thus are likely more stable representations of the underlying phenomena than the green “court” and blue
“defense” lines that represent fewer points of data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154434.g001
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evaluators who would explicitly work for any capital case referral source–those who would
“opt in” without the adversarial filtering effect (M = 3.33, SD = 1.17, n = 140)–compared to
those would fully abstain, t (180) = 3.07, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = 0.46.
Discussion
These are the first data to test the “filtering” effects of expert self-selection in adversarial cases
by documenting the association between expert attitudes and willingness to accept a referral
from a particular adversarial source. Filtering and selection effects in adversarial settings have
been assumed to exist, but with few empirical tests of the hypothesis to date. The present results
provide some evidence that filtering at various stages of the forensic referral system can intro-
duce systematic bias into the adversarial legal system. Evaluator attitudes and other attributes
may systematically influence from whom evaluators are willing to accept a referral in legal
cases.
The present study complements the Murrie and colleagues [9] experimental study that
showed that the adversarial system induces bias in presumably neutral experts. The current
study demonstrated that these experts have preexisting biases that may affect for whom they
are willing to work in the adversarial system–thus, likely amplifying the effects of the system-
induced biases when layered with preexisting expert biases. Together, the Murrie et al. findings
and the findings of the present investigation can be situated in basic psychological science.
Consistent with Lewin’s [10] theory that unique characteristics of persons interact with the
unique characteristics of situations to produce behavior, the data from these studies demon-
strate that both the adversarial system itself (i.e., the situation; Murrie et al) and unique charac-
teristics of the person (death penalty attitudes in this case, demonstrated in the present study)
affect expert behavior.
Evaluators who do not support capital punishment are more likely to prefer defense refer-
rals, and those with higher support for capital punishment are more likely to be involved in
capital cases generally. We expected that experts with strong support for the death penalty
would be more likely to accept prosecution-only referrals, but there were no experts who
would accept capital referrals from only the prosecution this sample of 206 forensic experts.
And the mean DPAS score–even among the group of evaluators who “more strongly support”
capital punishment is still low on that scale–indicating that forensic psychologists as a group
appear to have low support for the death penalty. Although the data show those who agree to
participate have stronger support for the death penalty than those who decline to be involved,
“stronger support” essentially boils down to “smaller dislike” than support per se (though the
range shows there is some variability in the data). Importantly, however–and relevant to the
“filtering effect” question–there is a subset of forensic experts with very low support for capital
punishment who choose to be involved selectively in defense work in capital cases, revealing
the likelihood of preexisting bias affecting adversarial involvement through self-selection
effects by forensic experts in capital cases.
The present findings about evaluator self-selection factors due to death penalty beliefs raise
the specter of skewed evaluator involvement in capital case evaluations. It appears that evalua-
tors who are willing to do capital casework may support the death penalty more strongly than
evaluators unwilling to do capital work or evaluations for the defense or court. Previous evi-
dence demonstrated that examiner death penalty attitudes systematically influenced percep-
tions of hypothetical death row inmates [14, 27–28]. These data, in combination with
mounting evidence of bias in forensic evaluations (see e.g., [9], [29–30]), highlight two research
needs: to examine how evaluator attitudes and beliefs systematically influence reasoning pro-
cesses and to develop methods to reduce the effects of systematic bias.
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Stronger death penalty support was clearly associated with examiners being more willing to
be involved in capital cases, evidenced both by the t-tests directly testing the hypothesis and in
the multinomial logistic regression results (see the sharp and positively-curving red line at the
top of the graph in Fig 1). As previously mentioned, each one-unit increase in death penalty
support more than tripled the odds that an examiner would accept any capital referral com-
pared to accepting just from the defense or defense-and-court. These findings—that psycholo-
gists who oppose the death penalty may be disproportionately absent from death penalty
evaluations–are consistent with Haney’s [16] observation about the death-qualification of
juries in capital cases. In both, capital proceedings are likely to include opinion formers and
decision makers (whether forensic expert or juror) who are disproportionately accepting of the
death penalty, compared to their broader populations. Another way of interpreting the results
is more optimistic. Although statistically significant and meaningful selection bias is evident in
the results as discussed above, an important piece of the story is that forensic psychologists as a
group appear to be largely open-minded about being involved adversarially–even in capital
cases. By far most of the sample fell into just one of the five outcome groups– 68% were in the
“accept from any source” group. Clearly then, most forensic psychologists report they are will-
ing to be involved in forensic cases in a non-adversarially-biased manner.
It should be noted that this paper takes a narrow methodological and analytical approach to
answering a broad question about expert bias in the legal system. However, the broader ques-
tion of how experts negotiate their moral perspectives and motivations in the legal framework
in which their expert evidence must be given is much more complicated and nuanced question
than this strictly quantitative and narrow approach can answer. Both broader qualitative and
narrow quantitative approaches are valuable for answering questions about expert bias, and
there are pros and cons to taking a narrow statistical approach like the current paper versus a
broader, more textured, and qualitative approach to the same kind of questions. There are
other recent papers in this line of research that take the broader, more textured, and qualitative
approach to exploring expert bias in the legal system for any readers interested in a fuller
picture.
For example, Neal and Grisso [30] wrote a paper wrestling with the definition of “bias” in
forensic experts and what those kinds of biases might look like in the forensic mental health
context. As another example–and one with data–Neal and Brodsky [31] integrated qualitative
and quantitative methods across two studies to explore the relation between the occupational
socialization process in forensic psychology and psychologists’ beliefs about their objectivity,
finding that higher occupational socialization is associated with a stronger belief in one’s ability
to be objective. And Neal and Brodsky [29] conducted both a qualitative and quantitative study
of forensic psychologists’ perceptions of bias and potential correction strategies in forensic
mental health evaluations. They found evidence of a “bias blind spot” in forensic evaluators,
which is the tendency for experts to perceive themselves as less vulnerable to bias than their
colleagues [32]; identified recurring situations that forensic psychologists reported pose chal-
lenges for their objectivity; and generated a list of 25 debiasing strategies that emerged from the
qualitative study. They categorized those 25 strategies into three groups: literature-identified
effective strategies perceived as useful by forensic clinicians, literature-identified ineffective
strategies nevertheless perceived as useful by forensic clinicians, and new debiasing strategies
identified by forensic clinicians that have not yet been subject to empirical investigation. They
also outlined literature-identified effective strategies not mentioned by forensic clinicians.
In addition to the issue of qualitative vs. quantitative methods, one of the reviewers was con-
cerned that this analysis comes from a narrow disciplinary perspective, pointing out that the
questions with which this manuscript is concerned might also be studied from other disciplin-
ary perspectives, such as the sociology of professions and the legal literature on death penalty
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jurisprudence. The larger project from which this data is drawn included a three-part project
in which I approached the question “are forensic psychologists biased in capital cases” from an
interdisciplinary and multi-method approach [33]. The sociology of occupational socialization
and its relevance for understanding how forensic psychologists come to highly value and
believe in their objectivity was the focus of Neal and Brodsky [31]. And Neal and Brodsky [29]
discussed at length and in great detail forensic psychologists’ feelings, motivations, and under-
standings of bias in capital cases.
With regard to limitations in the current paper, the respondents were volunteers interested
enough in the request for participation that they completed the survey. Although we identified
a large sample of forensic clinicians and obtained a high response rate, participants were identi-
fied through the APA directory and thus everyone in this sample was a member of the APA or
one of its divisions. Because not all forensic clinicians are members, the sample may not fully
represent the population of forensic clinicians. Future studies should include forensic mental
health professionals who are not members of professional associations. In addition, we asked
forensic evaluators to rate their death penalty attitudes in the same packet of questionnaires in
which we asked about willingness to be involved in capital case work. Therefore, it is possible
that some responses were affected by socially desirable responding. Another limitation is that
this survey asked clinicians about their willingness to accept various capital case referrals rather
than studying the real-world behavior of clinicians in accepting or declining capital case refer-
rals. Future studies should investigate actual involvement with these cases. Finally, the survey
did not ask whether evaluators had ever declined a referral because of the party that requested
the evaluation. Those data would usefully supplement these findings.
Future research is needed to explore how pre-selection affects experts’ information processing
and whether it transfers to biased decision-making. Strong convictions for or against capital pun-
ishment may influence the examiner’s reasoning process, potentially skewing pro- death penalty
experts’ opinions toward death outcomes and anti- death penalty experts’ opinions toward life
outcomes. Other evaluator attitudes and attributes relevant to the issues in a given case may affect
reasoning processes and conclusions in other ways as well. Some might argue that even if pre-
existing bias affects choice of adversarial party for whom to work that scientific or professional
objectivity would limit the effect of bias on the experts’ decision processes. However, a large and
growing body of literature challenges this assumption (see e.g., [9], [30], [34–36]). In sum, gain-
ing a better understanding of the limitations of expert witness objectivity may motivate the dis-
covery of effective debiasing strategies for experts to use, as well as motivate the legal system to
change the way it uses expert witnesses or the assumptions it makes about expert objectivity, all
toward the ultimate goal of improving psycholegal opinions and just outcomes in legal cases.
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